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When decisions are made that will impact on people’s health, who should be represented at 
the policy-making table? Is it sufficient to rely upon representatives from national 
governments (the State), or should other stakeholders participate – and if so, to what 
purpose? To advise? Make decisions? Or as funders? These issues lie at the core of a 
governance debate1 that has been rancorously discussed in relation to WHO for several 
years. In May 2016 the World Health Assembly (WHA) reached consensus: “WHO engages 
with non-State actors ….to encourage [them] to…protect and promote public health” – and 
considered non-State actors as “nongovernmental organizations [NGOs], private sector 
entities, philanthropic foundations and academic institutions”2.  
 
The resolution known as FENSA (Framework of engagement with non-State actors) had a 
long and difficult gestation, but is seen by many as a critical element of the ongoing WHO 
reform. Members States were generally supportive of the Framework, but NGOs voiced 
concern that “FENSA will increase….problematic entanglements between WHO and 
powerful private sector actors”, and were disappointed that the Framework fails to 
“acknowledge the different nature – and thus different roles – public and private sector 
actors should play in global health governance”3. In contrast, the private sector 
International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and Associations welcomed the 
framework as giving “an equitable voice to a vibrant community of public and private 
organizations whose shared goal is to make this world healthier”4. 
 
Concerns have long been raised about potential and actual conflicts of interest arising from 
WHO’s engagement with non-State actors (NSA), particularly those whose mandate hinges 
foremost upon the pursuit of profit rather than public health. WHO has acted upon these 
concerns in the past, and has not, for example, engaged with the tobacco or arms 
industries. The existence of conflicts of interest policies in WHO have not prevented 
problems arising. A Reuters investigation, for example, found not only that regional office 
PAHO had accepted money from companies such as Coca-Cola, Nestle and Unilever, but also 
that at least two of the 15 members of WHO’s Nutrition Guidance Expert Advisory Group 
had direct financial ties to the food industry5. The flow of people between the private and 
public sector, including secondment to WHO, raises questions of influence and impartiality. 
Philanthropic foundations can also have an influence and potential conflicts of interest. For 
example, the charitable UN Foundation placed a staff member in the WHO Director 
General’s office for a 2-year period; and the Gates Foundation seconded a manager to the 
WHO Polio and Emergencies Cluster6.  
 
The FENSA resolution recognizes and elevates the issue of the potential conflict of risk 
(including undue influence in setting/applying policies/norms/standards) from engagement 
with NSA and proposes mechanisms to avoid and manage these risks in the interests of 
public health – including through transparency, enhanced procedures and staff training. 
Moreover, the resolution sets out specific guidelines in relation to engagement with each 
category of NSA.  
 
FENSA is a necessary but insufficient response to the significant part the private sector plays 
determining population level health outcomes. FENSA specifically namechecks the biggest 
threat to human health (noncommunicable diseases, which are now the world’s leading 
cause of disability and death), but does not go so far as to propose any mechanisms by 
which the private sector’s actions in the production and marketing of commercial products 
can and should be governed. The links between the pursuit of profit and negative health 
outcomes associated with processed foods, alcohol, tobacco, air pollution, have been 
extensively described7. WHO could have used the opportunity to leverage its mandate and 
authority  to address the larger issue of governing the activities of industry, but FENSA 
focuses narrowly on the questions of risk assessment and management for WHO itself when 
engaging with the private sector. We are concerned that due diligence to protect brand 
WHO, even if well implemented, will not necessarily translate into better behaved industries 
at global and national levels that will act to protect and promote the health of their 
consumers.  
 
The relationship between public and private authority sits at the core of how we achieve 
NCD-related goals, and the governance of commercial determinants is crucial. Do we rely 
upon self-regulation by industry (e.g., marketing codes or voluntary initiatives to reduce 
harmful exposure), co-regulation of the activities of industry (e.g. public sector partnerships 
with the private sector are an overarching approach within of WHO’s 2013-2020 Global 
Action Plan on NCDs8), or public regulation of private sector activities. The latter approach is 
frequently promoted by experts as the preferred option – for example, in relation to the 
UK’s Responsibility Deals, the President of the UK Faculty of Public Health wrote that “There 
is no evidence that the ‘softly softly’ approach of engaging with industry rather than using 
legislation to improve people’s health has been more effective or quicker……sometimes the 
state has to step in to protect people.”9  Nonetheless, governance scholars note that 
problems of enforcement and industry subversion10 of public health goals raising the 
question of the effectiveness of this model.  
 
WHO and its governing body have taken an important step in democratizing the invite list to 
the policy table and establishing the dining etiquette. Now WHO needs to jump decisively 
off the right side of the fence and take more impactful measures, globally and nationally, to 
protect the health of the public by aggressively supporting governments and their partners 
to govern the health impact of Big Industry.  This will entail a shift from treating this as a 
technocratic and managerial project to the political one that it patently is.  A small but not 
insignificant part of the project entails embracing the public interest NGOs, which it has too 
long treated as adversaries, as the partners it needs to generate both public support and 
political incentives to induce national leaders to act.  
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